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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
state courts with federal rules of procedure or evidence in criminal
cases.27 A further ground for refusing application of the federal rule
of exclusion that the Court could conceivably employ is that that rule
is based in part at least on the privilege against self-incrimination con-
tained in the Fifth Amendment,2 8 and it has been recently held that this
privilege is not granted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 9 In view of these holdings, the court might merely indicate
that the methods of enforcing the protection are to be left to the state
courts.
Of course the mere fact that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari
in these cases does not mean that they must decide the constitutional
question involved in them. It is possible that the court will find that a
federal question has not been properly raised in the court below. How-
ever, since this problem has never been decided by the court, and the
constitutional issue is the only federal question presented on appeal, they
may be ready to decide this important issue. Of the alternative dispo-
sitions discussed, the more probable would seem to be that the court will
hold that freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is guaranteed
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the
means of making that protection effective will be left to the individual
states.
DANIEL WALKER
Exhaustion of State Remedies as Affecting Habeas Corpus Writs in
Federal Courts
(A Recent Modification of the Requirement)
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Wade v. Mayo1 would seem to give new hope to persons who have
been incarcerated and who are seeking release through the medium of a
writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts because of a denial of their
constitutional rights. Prior to this decision, many persons with possible
meritorious claims had been denied relief by habeas corpus because of
a failure to exhaust the state remedies available-in particular, a failure
to petition for certiorari after the decision of the state supreme court.2
The prior rule as to the exhaustion of state remedies, enunciated in
Ex Parte Hawk,3 was that "Ordinarily an application for habeas corpus
by one detained under a state court judgment of conviction for crime
will be entertained by a federal court only after all the state remedies
27 Bute v. flinois, 333 U.S. 640, 649-654 (1947) ; Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
28 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
528 (1945); of. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing). But see, Hale v. Haenkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905); Silverthora v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1919); Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of
Illegally Obtained Evidence in a National Prosecution (1944) 15 So. Cal. L. Rev. 60.
29 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946).
1 - U.S. -, 68 S. Ct. 1270 (1948).
2 Gordon v. Scudder, (C.C.A. 9th, 1947), 163 F. (2d) 518; Monsky v. Warden of
Clinton State Prison, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947), 163 F. (2d) 978; Stonebreaker v. Smyth
(C.C.A. 4th, 1947), 163 F. (2d) 501.
3 321 U.S. 114 (1943).
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available, including all appellate remedies in the state courts and in
this court by appeal or writ of certiorari, have been exhausted."
In W1rade v. Mayo, the petitioner, Wade, had been arrested in Florida
on a charge of breaking and entering. At the trial, Wade requested that
the trial judge appoint counsel to represent him because of his own
financial disability. The judge refused, and Wade was sentenced to serve
five years in the penitentiary. Wade subsequently obtained counsel, who
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Palm
Beach County, on the ground that the refusal of the trial judge to
appoint counsel for Wade was in violation of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The writ was quashed in that court on the authority of Florida cases
holding that under Florida law, a trial judge has no duty to appoint
counsel for the accused in non-capital cases. An appeal to the Supreme
Court of Florida was dismissed in that court without opinion. Counsel
for Wade did not petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States after that decision, but a year later filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, alleging a denial of due process, and pointing out
that in order to exhaust state remedies, Wade had pursued a writ of
habeas corpus through the Supreme Court of Florida. The district court
granted the writ, and, after hearing, discharged the petitioner. The Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, and the case came
before the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari.
It is clear that under the rule as set forth in Ex Parte Hawk as to the
requirements of exhaustion of state remedies, the failure of Wade to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari after the
decision of the Supreme Court of Florida dismissing the writ of habeas
corpus in the state courts would preclude relief by habeas corpus in the
federal court. Such a petition had been considered a necessity in order
for the federal courts to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.4
However, in the instant case, the Supreme Court saw fit to re-examine
the rule of Ex Parte Hawk, and modified that rule, largely on grounds
of policy. The Court expressed the view that the requirement of ex-
haustion of state remedies is not based upon a lack of power in the
federal courts to entertain petitions for habeas corpus before state
remedies had been exhausted, but rather on principles of comity between
state and federal judicial systems, and administrative necessity. How-
ever, the reasons for the principle cease after the highest state court has
rendered a decision on the merits. The review at that point in the federal
court is not a part of the state procedure, but an invocation of federal
authority growing out of the supremacy of the Constitution and the
necessity of giving effect to that supremacy where the state courts have
failed to do so. Thus, since there is no longer any danger of collision
between state and federal judicial systems after the question has been
pursued through the highest court in the state, the district court should
then have discretion to entertain the writ of habeas corpus, even though
the petitioner had failed to petition for certiorari after the decision of
the highest court of the state. The Court then enunciated the rule that
it is within the discretion of the federal court to weigh the reasons for
4 Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101 (1898); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179
(1906); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
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